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DETERMINANTS OF INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL R&D OFFSHORING:  
EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH FIRMS 
 
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the determinants of R&D offshoring of Spanish firms using infor-mation 
from the Panel of Technological Innovation. We find that being an exporter, continuous R&D 
engagement, applying for patents, being a subsidiary, and firm size are factors that positively 
affect the decision to offshore R&D. In addition, we obtain that the factors that influence this 
decision for firms that belong to a business group differ depending on whether the firm 
purchases R&D services within the group or through the market. 
Keywords: R&D offshoring, firms’ strategies, obstacles to innovation, independent firms, 
subsidiaries. 
 
 
DETERMINANTES DEL OFFSHORING DE I+D INTERNO Y EXTERNO: 
EVIDENCIA PARA EMPRESAS ESPAÑOLAS 
 
Resumen: 
Este trabajo analiza los determinantes del offshoring de I+D de las empresas españolas 
utilizando información del Panel de Innovación Tecnológica. Los resultados indican que ser 
exportador, realizar I+D de forma continua, solicitar patentes, ser una filial y el tamaño de la 
empresas afectan positivamente a la decisión de realizar offshoring de I+D. Además, se 
obtiene que los factores que influyen en esta decisión para las empresas que pertenecen a 
grupos empresariales difieren dependiendo de si la empresa compra los servicios de I+D 
dentro del grupo o a través del mercado. 
Palabras clave: Offshoring de I+D; estrategias empresariales, obstáculos a la innovación, 
empresas independientes, filiales. 
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1. Introduction 
As Jensen (2009) points out, over the last decade, the offshoring of manufactures has 
taken a back seat to that of services, since demand has grown substantially for more 
advanced services in technical and administrative areas.  Aspects such as the liberaliza-
tion of trade, economic and regulatory reforms, and technological advances in commu-
nication, digitalization, and the new commercialization of certain goods are behind this 
change.  
An important proportion of these exchanges of knowledge-intensive services corre-
sponds to R&D offshoring. For instance, the National Science Foundation (NSF) (2010) 
reports that, in the United States, there has been a rise of R&D imports of around 23% 
p.a. during the last decade.  In parallel, the empirical literature about the determinants of 
R&D offshoring at the firm level has also grown.1  
For this analysis, it is important to remember that the concept of R&D offshoring in-
cludes international outsourcing of R&D services, as well as R&D purchases consisting 
of technology transactions within a group (internal or captive offshoring). More specifi-
cally, within this concept of offshoring, we can also consider the purchases of R&D 
services that firms located in Spain make from other firms in their same group, but 
which are located abroad.   
Why could we expect a different behavior between independent single firms and com-
panies in business groups? Previous empirical literature gathers evidence about a differ-
ent propensity to offshore R&D services between these two groups of firms. In their 
analysis of a sample of French manufacturing firms from 1993 to 2001, Jabbour and 
Zuniga (2009) show that individual firms appear to be more active in international R&D 
outsourcing than firms that belong to business groups.  
Holl and Rama (2014) compare the technology sourcing via R&D outsourcing, R&D 
outsource offshoring, domestic cooperation for innovation and international cooperation 
for innovation, distinguishing between foreign subsidiaries and national firms. Their 
results for a sample of Spanish firms suggest not only that these choices are interde-
                                                
1 Some recent examples are the analyses made by Jabbour and Zuniga (2009), García-Vega and Huergo 
(2011), Martínez-Noya et al. (2012) and Holl and Rama (2014). 
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pendent, but also that the behavior of foreign subsidiaries is different. In comparison 
with national subsidiaries, foreign subsidiaries show less propensity towards national 
R&D outsourcing, as well as towards R&D offshoring.  
In addition, there is also evidence of a different effect from these two governance modes 
-captive R&D offshoring and offshore R&D outsourcing on firms’ performance. Gar-
cía-Vega and Huergo (2013) find that subsidiaries of foreign multinational firms which 
acquire R&D services through the group are more innovative than the average innova-
tive Spanish firm.  
Also for Spanish companies, Nieto and Rodríguez (2011, 2013) obtain that, although 
both models of offshoring are positively related to innovation results and productivity, 
the impact of captive offshoring on innovation outperforms the impact of offshore out-
sourcing. In addition, they find that offshoring also has a positive and indirect impact on 
productivity through innovation, and that this indirect effect is greater in captive off-
shoring than in international outsourcing. All of this leads us to expect a different be-
havior from foreign subsidiaries in relation to domestic independent firms. 
In this paper, we explore the determinants of R&D offshoring for innovative Spanish 
firms using information from the Technological Innovation Panel (Panel de Innovación 
Tecnológica, henceforth referred to using its Spanish acronym PITEC). The paper aims 
to contribute to this literature by analyzing whether the choice of the governance mode 
for R&D offshoring is driven by different determinants in the case of firms belonging to 
business groups in comparison with individual independent firms.  
Our results confirm previous empirical literature about the determinants of R&D off-
shoring: being an exporting firm, continuous R&D engagement, applying for patents, 
being a subsidiary, and firm size increase the probability of offshoring. In addition, we 
find that the factors that influence the decision to offshore R&D for firms that belong to 
a business group differ depending on whether the firm purchases the R&D services 
within the group or through the market: a lack of financing negatively affects firms that 
offshore R&D exclusively within the group, while a lack of information reduces the 
probability of undertaking R&D offshoring only with suppliers outside the group. 
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2. R&D offshoring strategies: firms’ motives and determinants 
The reasons why companies decide to carry out outsourcing or offshoring activities 
have been frequently analyzed in economic literature. They are basically associated with 
a reduction of costs and risks, with an increase in organizational flexibility, which al-
lows a quicker adaptation to changing market needs, or with the generation of competi-
tive advantages, freeing internal resources that can be engaged in core business activi-
ties. 
However, these activities also entail disadvantages. In this regard, transaction cost theo-
ry, agency theory and the resource-based view are the approaches most used in the liter-
ature to explain why companies decide to outsource part of their production. 
According to Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1979, and 1981), the decision to in-
ternalize certain transactions or make them through the market depends on their costs, 
which may be associated with search costs, selection costs, bargaining costs and coordi-
nating work. The higher these transaction costs are, the greater the propensity of firms 
to perform activities internally is, while they will outsource more insofar as transaction 
costs decrease.  
From the agency theory perspective, the principal will try to establish the contract that 
best guarantees the optimal effort of the agent. This obviously implies agency costs as-
sociated with monitoring and evaluation, as opportunism is an important risk factor in 
an outsourcing contract (Aubert et al., 1998).  
Consistent with the resource-based view, a need for access to complementary resources 
or capabilities that are not available within the company will be behind the outsourcing 
decision (Peteraf, 1993; Argyres, 1996). In the particular case of R&D outsourcing, 
firms would benefit from the investments, innovations and specialized professional 
skills of external suppliers (Anagnostou and Carthy, 2004). 
To these arguments, we have to add the factors that influence the international dimen-
sion of offshoring. Regardless of the governance mode (through the group or through 
the market), one of the reasons to offshore may be the reduction of costs, especially 
labour costs, if tasks are outsourced in countries where wages are lower. Other reasons 
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may be the intent to follow a growth strategy, competitive pressure or access to quali-
fied personnel (Lewin and Peeters, 2006). 
As for the specific case of R&D offshoring, according to Martínez-Noya et al. (2012), 
the determinants of international R&D outsourcing would be related to both the interna-
tional experience of the company and its skills and technological resources. The firm’s 
experience in international markets would reduce the costs of search and selection of 
suitable foreign suppliers. In addition, we could expect that, by selling to a larger mar-
ket, exporters decrease their financial constraints, making international outsourcing rela-
tively less costly for them (García-Vega and Huergo, 2011). The studies by Jabbour and 
Zuniga (2009), García-Vega and Huergo (2011), and Holl and Rama (2014) gather clear 
evidence of the positive relation between the exporting character of firms and interna-
tional R&D outsourcing.   
Furthermore, although greater internal capabilities can make international outsourcing 
less necessary, because of the complexity of the innovation process, firms could find it 
more efficient to outsource non-core parts of this process in foreign countries where 
they have leading or cheaper suppliers. This strategy would help companies to reduce 
their operating costs, achieving a greater focus on their core competencies (Anagnostou 
and Carthy, 2004). In addition, internal resources and capabilities can increase firms’ 
absorptive capacities of foreign knowledge, stimulating the complementarity between 
internal and external R&D (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006; Goyal et al. 2008).  
One of these internal resources is qualified employment. Representatives of the theory 
of human capital (Hamermesh, 1980, 1993; Kremer, 1993; Dunne and Schmitz, 1995) 
highlight the complementarity between physical and human capital, the advantages de-
rived from grouping qualified workers with other qualified workers, and the improved 
capacity to amortize fixed costs associated with hiring qualified workers. For this rea-
son, it seems logical to think that firms’ employment in internal R&D activities would 
be complementary to R&D offshoring.  
In the same line, it is also expected that obstacles to innovation have a negative effect 
on the decision to invest in technological activities and, therefore, on the decision to 
offshore R&D (Garcia and Huergo, 2011). According to Chaney (2013), when faced 
with fixed costs associated with exporting and liquidity restrictions, for some firms it 
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would be profitable to export, but they decide not to because of the doubts that they 
have that liquidity is not enough. Something similar may occur with the offshoring of 
R&D services if the search for foreign suppliers generates sunk costs that increase in a 
context of financial constraints or lack of information.  
To summarize, according to previous literature, the more international experience and 
technological resources and capabilities the firm possesses, the more likely it will out-
source R&D services internationally compared to other sourcing strategies.  
However, we might think that the intensity of these relationships may differ between 
individual firms and companies that belong to business groups. In the latter case, com-
panies not only have the option of performing international R&D outsourcing, but also 
internal captive offshoring, i.e., outsourcing part of the production process in companies 
from the same group located abroad. In addition, firms in groups and especially multi-
nationals can benefit from the resources and capabilities of the group and tend to per-
ceive obstacles to innovation as significantly less relevant than independent firms 
(Iammarino et al., 2009). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: When companies decide to offshore R&D services, a lack of financing is 
an obstacle relatively more important for independent firms than for firms belonging to 
business groups.  
Moreover, in the case of firms in groups, we can wonder what leads the selection of the 
governance model, or why they sometimes choose a combination of both channels (in-
ternal and external). A first explanation is related to technology leakage. External R&D 
offshoring implies higher risks in situations of imperfect contracts, hold-up problems, 
and cultural differences (e.g., Baccara, 2007, Lai et al., 2009, Ornelas and Turner, 
2008), making firms more sensitive to a lack of information. In this context, companies 
can be prone to offshoring through the group, avoiding exposure to subcontractors, es-
pecially in countries with poor intellectual property rights (García-Vega and Huergo, 
2011). On the basis of this argument, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
Hypothesis 2: In the case of firms belonging to business groups, a lack of information is 
an obstacle relatively more important for external R&D offshoring than for internal 
R&D offshoring. 
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For the same reason, we can expect that the selection of the offshoring channel depends 
on the relevance that companies allocate to internal sources of information in order to 
innovate as compared to institutional and market sources of information. This leads to 
formulating the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  Firms belonging to business groups that find institutional and market 
sources of information for innovation very relevant compared to internal sources of 
information are more likely to offshore R&D services through the market.  
3. Database  
Our empirical analysis is done with the information provided in the Panel of Innovation 
Technology (PITEC), from 2004 to 2010. The PITEC is a statistical database created in 
the format of panel data and the result of the joint effort by the Spanish Foundation for 
Science and Technology (FECYT), the National Institute of Statistics (INE), and the 
Cotec Foundation along with assessment by a group of academic experts. Its goal is to 
facilitate the monitoring of technological innovation activities by Spanish firms2.  
The panel is selected on the basis of two national surveys carried out by the INE in the 
innovation sector: “Survey on Technological Innovation of Firms” (the Spanish version 
of the Community Innovation Survey) and “Statistics on R&D Activities”. The PITEC 
was started in the year 2003 with two representative samples: a sample of firms with 
200 or more workers (with an estimated representation of 73%) and a sample of compa-
nies with internal R&D expenditures. In 2004, the panel was expanded to include a 
sample of firms with fewer than 200 employees and external expenditures on R&D but 
no internal R&D, and a representative subsample of firms with fewer than 200 workers 
and no innovation expenditures. 
Although the PITEC includes a sample of firms that do not undertake technological 
activities, given the objective of this study, we focus the analysis on the sample of inno-
vative firms, that is, firms that have positive innovation expenditures during the period. 
                                                
2 The PITEC is publicly available to researchers at: http://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC/Paginas/por_que.aspx. 
The files accessible on this site correspond to the files maintained by INE, except for the “anonymization” 
of a series of variables so that corresponding firms cannot be identified.  López (2011) shows that the 
expected biases due to this anonymization are small through the comparison of regressions that use origi-
nal and harmonized data alternatively.  
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There are, on average, around 7,500 companies with innovation expenditures in the 
PITEC each year. Overall, our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 31,425 
observations, 12,659 of which correspond to companies that belong to a business group.  
In the PITEC, companies answer questions related to the R&D done within the firm 
(internal R&D) or outside the firm through a contract or an agreement (external R&D). 
They also specify whether the purchase of services takes place in Spain or abroad, and 
whether the suppliers are firms from the same group, firms outside the group, public 
institutions, universities, etc. With this in mind, we will use the term R&D offshoring 
for purchases of R&D services abroad, regardless of the provider’s location.  
Most firms in our sample do not offshore R&D; only around 7% are R&D offshorers. 
This percentage is constant throughout the time period. As we mentioned in the intro-
duction, it is important to differentiate between the following two cases: when suppliers 
are firms from the same business group, and when purchases are made from the market; 
in other words, when suppliers are firms outside the group, public research centers, uni-
versities, etc.  
In Table 1, we see the number of observations that correspond to firms from the PITEC 
that offshore R&D and whether or not these firms belong to a group, specifying whether 
the suppliers of R&D services are firms from the group or other firms and institutions. It 
is obvious that independent firms can only acquire R&D services outside the group. On 
the other hand, note that even in multinational firms, the majority of offshoring consists 
of suppliers outside the group and in only a small percentage of cases (9.2%) do firms 
combine suppliers of both types. 
 
Table 1. R&D offshoring in the PITEC 
(Number of observations in the sample) 
 R&D offshoring 
 
Internal  
offshoring 
External  
offshoring  
Internal and external 
offshoringa) Total 
Independent firms 0 
(0.0) 
1,053 
(100.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
1,053 
Firms in groups 955 
(44.2) 
1,405 
(65.0) 
199 
(9.2) 
2,160 
Total 955 
(29.7) 
2.458 
(76.5) 
199 
(6.2) 
3,214 
Note: Percentages over the total of each row are shown in parentheses. a) This column is included in the 
previous ones. 
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As for the intensity of R&D offshoring (defined as the percentage of R&D purchases 
from foreign providers over the total amount of R&D purchases), in Figure 1 we can see 
that, regardless of whether the firm has a group, offshorers tend to combine foreign pur-
chases with purchases in Spain. Nevertheless, the percentage of imports is higher in 
firms that belong to a group.   
 
 
Note: Percentage calculated for offshorers with corresponding purchases.  
 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the intensity of external R&D outsourcing is also 
higher in firms in groups, which would at first seem to contradict the findings put for-
ward by Jabbour and Zuniga (2009) for a sample of French firms from 1993 to 2001, 
according to which individual firms were the most active in international R&D out-
sourcing.  This is one of the issues which will be more deeply analyzed in this paper. 
4. Empirical model and variables 
To analyze the determinants of R&D offshoring, we estimate two different types of 
specifications. First, we turn our attention to the factors that affect this activity for the 
whole sample of innovative firms. The analysis refers to the extensive margin (the deci-
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
R&D internal offshorers R&D external offshorers R&D offshorers
Figure 1. R&D offshoring intensity
(Percentage of R&D imports of the total amount of R&D purchases)
Independent firms Firms in groups Total
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sion to offshore) as well as to the intensive margin (the magnitude of the purchases of 
R&D services).3 This study is done through the estimation of a Heckman or generalized 
Tobit model, where two equations are estimated simultaneously for maximum likeli-
hood. The first equation refers to the firm’s decision to buy R&D services abroad (se-
lection equation), while the second refers to the intensity with which purchases are 
made (intensity equation).   
More formally, the model is the following: the intensity of R&D offshoring of firm i in 
the year t is described by using the latent variable *itoss : 
*  it it itoss z e , 
where itz  is a vector of determinants for R&D offshoring intensity that is measured as 
the percentage that purchases of R&D services abroad represent in the total amount of 
R&D service purchases.  
However, this intensity is only observed if the firm decides to import R&D services.  
The selection equation is expressed by the following equation: 
* '1 if  ( ) 0
0 otherwise
   
it it it
it
oss F X b u
doss , 
where itdoss  represents the decision of firm i in the year t to buy R&D services abroad 
as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm does R&D offshoring and 0 
otherwise, *oss  is a latent variable that can be interpreted as expected benefits of that 
decision, X is the vector of explanatory variables and u is the error term.   
Conditioned on whether the firm imports R&D services, we can observe the intensity of 
this activity: 
* if 1
0 if 0
     
it it it it
it
it
oss z e doss
oss
doss
, 
                                                
3 As Markusen (2005) suggests, although liberalization allows the trade volume of already-existing prod-
ucts to expand (intensive margin), the increase in service offshoring is also related to the expansion of 
trade in the extensive margin, since new tasks can be commercialized because of innovation in communi-
cation and technology.   
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where we assume that the error terms u and e follow a bivariate normal distribution with 
mean zero,  1 and  U e , and coefficient of correlation rho. Notice that in this case we 
do not distinguish between internal and external R&D offshoring. 
Secondly, we focus on the subsample of firms that belong to business groups and that 
therefore can purchase R&D services through two different (non-exclusive) channels: 
from other companies in the group or from the market (firms or institutions outside the 
group). As observed when analyzing the distribution of R&D offshorers, only a small 
percentage of firms that belong to a business group undertake both internal and external 
R&D offshoring, while the majority choose a single channel when they make purchases 
of foreign R&D.  
As a way to further explore the behavior of firms that belong to a group, a bivariate 
Probit or Biprobit model is estimated. This allows us to gain a better understanding of 
the elements that lead firms to choose different channels at the moment of offshoring 
R&D. Just as Greene (2003) suggests, the bivariate Probit model is an extension of the 
multi-equational models of classical regression, in which a system of equations where 
errors are correlated is considered. According to Zellner and Huang (1962), taking into 
account the correlation between the perturbations, one may obtain more efficient esti-
mations than if each equation is estimated separately.  
For the specific case of internal and external R&D offshoring, the specification of the 
biprobit model is the following:   
* '
1 11 if  
0 otherwise
0    
I iti it
it
I
toss wd
b
oss  
* '
221 if  
0 otherwise
0
 
   
E iEi t it
it
toss w bdoss  
where   and  I Eit itds ossdos  represent the decisions by firm i in year t to undertake internal 
or external R&D offshoring, respectively, with both variables as a binary that takes the 
value 1 when the firm does R&D offshoring and 0 otherwise.  The vector w corresponds 
to the explanatory variables related to the characteristics of the country of origin and to 
the specific characteristics of the firm. The error terms of these equations follow a nor-
mal distribution with: 
         1 2 1 2 1 20,  1 and ,C          it it it it it it IEE E Var Var ov ,. 
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In both models, the choice of independent variables follows previous literature on the 
determinants of R&D strategies described in Section 2. In particular, we classify the 
main explanatory variables in two groups according to whether they are related to the 
firm’s international experience or to its technological resources and capabilities. The 
main statistics that describe these variables can be found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
Variables All Firms Firms in groups 
Independent 
Firms 
Difference of 
means test 
t-test p-value
R&D offshoring (in logarithms) 0.76 1.36 0.37 -32.8 0.000 
R&D offshorerd 0.07 0.11 0.034 -33.8 0.000 
R&D offshorer from the market (external offshorer)d 0.05 0.74 0.036 -18.8 0.000 
R&D offshorer within the group (internal offshorer)d 0.02 0.50 0.00 -38.9 0.000 
R&D offshoring from the market (in logarithms) 0.56 0.84 0.37 -19.1 0.000 
R&D offshoring within the group (in logarithms) 0.25 0.63 0.00 -31.3 0.000 
International experience      
    Exporter (t-1)d 0.59 0.65 0.53 -23.4 0.000 
Technological resources and capabilities      
    R&D employment (number of employees) 18.71 12.65 22.60 44.6 0.000 
    Continuous R&D engagementd 0.78 0.82 0.74 -17.9 0.000 
    Patent applicantd 0.17 0.19 0.15 -9.5 0.000 
    Obstacles to innovation:      
    - Lack of financing 1.84 1.67 1.94 33.4 0.000 
    - Lack of information 1.24 1.17 1.28 14.9 0.000 
    Size (in logarithms) 4.12 5.04 3.51 -120.0 0.000 
    Size squared (in logarithms) 19.33 27.76 13.89 -110.0 0.000 
    Medium and high-technology manufacturingd 0.33 0.35 0.32 -6.7 0.000 
    Medium and high-technology servicesd 0.14 0.10 0.16 16.6 0.000 
    Sources of information for innovation:      
    - Institutional sourcesd 0.18 0.17 0.19 3.2 0.0015 
    - Market sourcesd  0.54 0.54 0.54 0.6 0.554 
    - Internal sourcesd 0.41 0.42 0.41 -2.2 0.025 
Foreign subsidiaryd 0.08 0.20 0.00 -80.6 0.000 
Notes: d= dummy variable. (t-1) indicates that the variable is lagged one period. t-test denotes the differ-
ence of means test between independent firms and firms in groups. The contrast corresponds to the Wil-
coxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney) for discrete variables. 
 
The indicator of international experience most used in this context is the exporting char-
acter of the firm. In this line, we use a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm 
exports in the current year. In order to avoid problems of simultaneity, this variable is 
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included in the estimations lagged one period. As can be seen in Table 2, the difference 
of means test shows that international experience is higher among firms that belong to 
business groups. 
To measure a firm’s technological resources and capabilities, we use a wide range of 
indicators. Firstly, we take into account the firm’s R&D employment. The information 
in the PITEC allows us to distinguish what part of a firm’s total employment corre-
sponds to R&D researchers. The term researcher refers specifically to professionals who 
work on the creation of new concepts, products or processes, methods and systems, and 
on the management of their respective projects.   
Secondly, in the database, firms declare whether they have performed continuous R&D 
activities and whether they have been patent applicants in the last three years. With this 
information, we have created two dummy variables that take the value 1 if, respectively, 
the firm engages in R&D continuously or if it has applied for patents in the current year 
or in the previous two years.  
Thirdly, the PITEC allows us to consider the lack of financing and the lack of infor-
mation as factors that hinder innovation. The lack of financing is associated with the 
lack of a firm’s own funds, the lack of external financing, and innovation costs. In the 
survey, firms value each of these factors on a scale of 0-3 (irrelevant, low importance, 
medium importance, or high importance), the average of the factors serving as an indi-
cator of lack of financing.  As for lack of information, two aspects are taken into con-
sideration: a lack of information about technology and a lack of information about mar-
kets. The way to quantify them is the same as in the previous case.   
Fourthly, in the survey, firms declare the importance of institutional, internal, and mar-
ket sources in order to innovate. From these sources, they gain information for new in-
novative projects or to complete ongoing innovative projects. Institutional sources con-
cern universities or other higher education centers, from public research bodies or from 
technology centers. Sources from the market refer to whether the information was ob-
tained from suppliers of equipment, material, components or software, from clients, 
competitors or other firms from the same branch of activity, or by consultants, commer-
cial laboratories or private R&D institutions. And internal sources refer to whether the 
information comes from the same firm or from the business group. In the PITEC, firms 
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indicate whether these sources of information have high, medium, or low importance, or 
no importance at all. Based on the answers, we assign for each of the three types of 
sources a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the evaluation given by the firm for 
that source type is high, and zero otherwise.   
Finally, we also consider the firm that belongs to a sector of medium-high technology 
according to the NACE-2009 classification, and firm size (measured as the logarithm of 
the number of workers).  
Several authors have analyzed the relation between firm size and technological inputs. 
As for offshoring strategy, traditionally we might think that large firms find providers 
abroad more easily, especially with regard to manufacturing activities. However, given 
the technological developments of the last few decades, searching costs have decreased, 
benefiting both large and small companies. 
Chen and Sen (2012) propose that the effect of scale economies can drive both integrat-
ed and disintegrated downstream firms to offshore intermediate goods. In a context of 
economies of scale in upstream production, a disintegrated downstream firm would tend 
to purchase intermediate goods from a pure offshore provider rather than its vertically 
integrated rival. And a vertically integrated firm would also outsource offshore because 
of the incentive to exploit scale economies.  
From the empirical point of view, the evidence about the link between firm size and 
R&D offshoring is not conclusive. For example, Chang and Robin (2006) confirm that 
firm size is a key variable for explaining R&D intensity and technology imports in Tai-
wanese manufacturing firms, following the pattern of an inverted U. For Japanese firms, 
Hideo and Sadao (2011) find that a larger company tends to generate more patents from 
a research project but not more valuable patents, concluding that the main source of 
such a scale economy is not internal knowledge inflow but the “appropriation ad-
vantage” of a large firm. 
Notice that, in general, in our sample, our indicators of firms’ technological resources 
and capabilities show a greater average for firms in business groups. The remarkable 
exceptions are R&D employment and public sources of information, which are statisti-
cally higher in independent domestic companies. 
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Lastly, given the specific objective of this paper, in the estimates for the whole sample, 
we identify foreign subsidiaries through a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
firm is a private subsidiary with at least 50% participation of foreign capital.  
5. Results 
As we have explained before, to analyze the determinants of R&D offshoring, we esti-
mate two different types of specifications. Firstly, we estimate a generalized Tobit mod-
el for the  intensity of this activity. Secondly, we use a Biprobit model to focus on the 
subsample of firms that belong to business groups and that therefore can purchase R&D 
services through two different channels: from other companies in the group (internal 
offshoring) or from the market (external offshoring).  
The results for the generalized Tobit model are reported in Table 3. As for the decision 
to undertake R&D offshoring (selection equation), being an exporter, continuous R&D 
engagement, R&D employment, applying for patents, and institutional and market 
sources of information have a positive impact.  
In addition, the effect of size shows a non-linear association with the probability of off-
shoring. A lack of finance does not seem to affect this decision, while a lack of infor-
mation decreases the probability of importing R&D services. In particular, when a firm 
is an exporter, the probability of undertaking R&D offshoring rises by 2.8 percentage 
points, and a lack of information reduces the probability of offshoring by approximately 
0.4 percentage points.   
These results are coherent with previous evidence, globally confirming that the more 
international experience and the more technological resources and capabilities the firm 
possesses, the more likely it will offshore R&D services. 
As for intensity of R&D offshoring, the exporting character of the firm is not a signifi-
cant determinant. However, most of the variables that represent firm technical capabili-
ties keep a positive effect. In addition, in line with the descriptives of Table 1 and Fig-
ure 1, being a subsidiary increases both the probability of offshoring and its intensity.  
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Table 3. Determinants of R&D offshoring (generalized Tobit model). All firms 
 
 
Propensity to 
offshore R&D 
Pr( ) 1doss  
 Intensity of R&D offshoring 
International experience    
  Exporter (t-1)  0.028***  0.051 
 (0.003)  (0.095) 
Technical resources & capabilities    
  R&D employment 0.001***  0.013*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002) 
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.023***   
 (0.003)   
  Patent applicant 0.039***  0.218*** 
 (0.004)  (0.083) 
  Obstacles to innovation:    
  - Lack of finance -0.002  -0.036 
 (0.002)  (0.049) 
  - Lack of information -0.004**  -0.170*** 
 (0.002)  (0.055) 
  Size 0.052***  0.506*** 
 (0.004)  (0.136) 
  Size squared -0.003***  0.014 
 (0.000)  (0.013) 
  Medium & high-tech manufact.   0.016***  0.384*** 
 (0.003)  (0.085) 
  Medium & high-tech services -0.008**  0.368*** 
 (0.004)  (0.140) 
  Sources of information for innovation:    
  -  Institutional sources  0.014***  0.043 
 (0.003)  (0.087) 
  - Market sources  0.015***  0.007 
 (0.004)  (0.117) 
  - Internal sources  -0.005  0.114 
 (0.004)  (0.109) 
Foreign subsidiary 0.062***  0.651*** 
 (0.006)  (0.100) 
Selection term rho   0.737*** 
   (0.051) 
No. obs. not censured/censured 29,117/2,308 
No. observations  31,425 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported at sample means for probability of offshoring and for the expected 
value of R&D offshoring intensity conditional on offshoring R&D. For dummy variables, the marginal 
effect corresponds to the discrete change from 0 to 1. Estimated standard errors in parenthesis. (t-1) de-
notes that the variable is lagged one period. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  
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It is noteworthy that firms in medium and high-tech manufacturing sectors have a high-
er propensity to offshore R&D, while the effect is the opposite for companies in medi-
um and high-tech services activities. However, regardless of whether they are services 
or manufacturing firms, belonging to a sector of medium-high technology has a positive 
impact on offshoring intensity. Notice also that the correlation term is statistically dif-
ferent from zero, which indicates that it is necessary to make this correction when esti-
mating the intensity determinants.4   
This selection model is also estimated by distinguishing between individual independent 
firms and those companies that belong to a business group (Table 4). Irrespective of 
belonging to a business group, exporter character, continuous R&D engagement, R&D 
employment and applying for patents keep their positive impact on the probability of 
undertaking R&D offshoring. Institutional and market sources of information also in-
crease offshoring probability in all cases, as the marginal effects are substantially higher 
for firms that belong to a group.   
However, a lack of information decreases the probability of importing R&D services 
exclusively for firms in business groups, while a lack of finance only negatively affects 
this decision in independent firms. In particular, a lack of information reduces the prob-
ability of offshoring by approximately 1.1 percentage points for companies in business 
groups and a lack of financing decreases the probability of undertaking R&D offshoring 
by approximately 0.4 percentage points in the case of individual firms. This last result 
gives support to our hypothesis 1, pointing out that a lack of funding is an obstacle rela-
tively more important for the offshoring decision in the case of independent firms in 
comparison to firms that belong to business groups. 
As for the intensity of R&D offshoring, belonging to a high or medium-tech manufac-
turing sector and institutional sources of information have a positive impact in the case 
of companies that belong to business groups. On the contrary, internal sources of infor-
mation positively affect the intensity of R&D offshoring just for individual independent 
firms, while a lack of financing is not relevant regardless of the type of firm. 
                                                
4 When firms from the manufacturing and service sectors are analyzed separately (see Table A1 of the 
Annex), we see that the trends for all firms are maintained, although the magnitude of the effects differs 
between both firm groups and the correlation term rho is only statistically significant for manufacturing 
firms.   
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Table 4. Determinants of R&D offshoring by type of firm (generalized Tobit model) 
 
 Firms in groups Independent firms 
 Propensity Pr( ) 1doss
Intensity of R&D 
offshoring  
Propensity 
Pr( ) 1doss  
Intensity of R&D 
offshoring  
International experience     
  Exporter (t-1)  0.042*** 0.058 0.021*** 0.068 
 (0.006) (0.129) (0.003) (0.133) 
Technical resources & capabilities     
  R&D employment 0.002*** 0.021*** 0.001*** 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.040***  0.015***  
 (0.006)  (0.003)  
  Patent applicant 0.063*** 0.110 0.023*** 0.375*** 
 (0.007) (0.105) (0.004) (0.126) 
  Obstacles to innovation:     
  - Lack of finance 0.003 -0.051 -0.004*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.064) (0.002) (0.075) 
  - Lack of information -0.011*** -0.140* 0.0001 -0.210*** 
 (0.004) (0.073) (0.002) (0.080) 
  Size 0.104*** 0.744*** 0.031*** -0.496* 
 (0.011) (0.210) (0.005) (0.263) 
  Size squared -0.006*** -0.006 -0.002*** 0.116*** 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.032) 
  Medium & high-tech manufact.   0.032*** 0.500*** 0.005 0.058 
 (0.006) (0.107) (0.003) (0.136) 
  Medium & high-tech services -0.031*** 0.484** 0.002 0.317* 
 (0.009) (0.218) (0.004) (0.169) 
  Sources of information for innovation:     
  -  Institutional sources  0.028*** 0.037 0.006* 0.101 
 (0.007) (0.113) (0.003) (0.130) 
  - Market sources  0.029*** -0.040 0.009** 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.151) (0.004) (0.176) 
  - Internal sources  -0.014* 0.068 0.001 0.391** 
 (0.008) (0.141) (0.004) (0.161) 
Foreign subsidiary 0.064*** 0.525***   
 (0.008) (0.108)   
Selection term rho  0.706***  -0.007 
  (0.069)  (0.099) 
No. obs. not censured/censured 11,119/1,540 17,998/768 
No. observations  12,659 18,766 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported at sample means for the probability of offshoring and for the 
expected value of the R&D offshoring intensity conditional on offshoring R&D. For dummy variables, 
the marginal effect corresponds to the discrete change from 0 to 1. Estimated standard errors in parenthe-
sis. (t-1) denotes that the variable is lagged one period. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
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It is also important to observe that, although the size variable affects offshoring intensity 
in both groups of firms, the sign of the impact differs according to whether a firm be-
longs to a group or not. 
Until now, we have analysed the determinants of firms’ decisions on R&D offshoring 
without distinguishing between internal and external R&D offshoring. However, in the 
case of firms that belong to business groups, the decisions to offshore R&D services 
through the group or through the market could be correlated. Therefore, we also under-
take an estimation of the determinants of these two decisions through a bivariate Probit 
model.  
Notice that this model is estimated only for companies in groups, which are the ones for 
which the choice of governance mode is relevant. It is also noteworthy that, as in the 
univariate Probit model, the estimated coefficients in the bivariate Probit model do not 
directly quantify the increase in the probability given a marginal change in an independ-
ent variable. Instead, it is necessary to calculate the partial derivatives or marginal ef-
fects, which are presented in Table 5. 
The coefficient IE  is significant, indicating that for firms that belong to business 
group, the decisions to do R&D offshoring within the group or through the market are 
correlated. At the same time, we can observe that the results for most variables show 
tendencies and magnitudes similar to the ones in Table 4 for firms in groups. Regardless 
of the governance mode, being an exporting firm, R&D employment, applying for pa-
tents and belonging to a high or medium-tech manufacturing sector positively affect 
R&D offshoring. Firm size also keeps its non-linear impact.  
However, there are some remarkable differences regarding obstacles to innovation and 
sources of information for innovation. A lack of financing seems to stimulate the choice 
of the market channel in the offshoring decision, while a lack of information shows the 
opposite impact, as it is a less relevant obstacle for internal R&D offshoring than it is 
for external R&D offshoring.  
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Table 5.  Determinants of internal and external R&D offshoring  (Biprobit model).  
Only firms in business groups 
 Propensity to offshore R&D  
 
Internally 
Pr( ) 1Idoss  
Externally 
Pr( ) 1Edoss   
International experience    
  Exporter (t-1)  0.023*** 0.022***  
 (0.003) (0.005)  
Technical resources & capabilities    
  R&D employment 0.001*** 0.002***  
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.006* 0.036***  
 (0.004) (0.006)  
  Patent applicant 0.010*** 0.057***  
 (0.004) (0.006)  
  Obstacles to innovation:    
  - Lack of finance -0.002 0.006**  
 (0.002) (0.003)  
  - Lack of information -0.003 -0.007**  
 (0.002) (0.003)  
  Size 0.034*** 0.078***  
 (0.006) (0.009)  
  Size squared -0.002*** -0.005***  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
  Medium & high-tech manufacturing   0.011*** 0.022***  
 (0.003) (0.005)  
  Medium & high-tech services 0.005 -0.030***  
 (0.006) (0.007)  
  Sources of information for innovation:    
  -  Institutional sources  -0.0004 0.024***  
 (0.003) (0.006)  
  - Market sources  -0.002 0.030***  
 (0.005) (0.007)  
  - Internal sources  -0.007 -0.018***  
 (0.005) (0.006)  
Foreign subsidiary 0.078*** -0.002  
 (0.007) (0.006)  
IE  0.348*** 
 (0.030) 
No. observations  12,659 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported at sample means for the probability of observing each outcome. For 
dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the discrete change from 0 to 1. Estimated standard 
errors in parenthesis. (t-1) denotes that the variable is lagged one period. * significant at 10%; ** signifi-
cant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Similarly, we find that a high relevance of institutional and market sources of infor-
mation increases the probability of offshoring R&D services through the market, where-
as a high importance of internal sources of information reduces this probability. These 
latter two results provide evidence for our hypotheses 2 and 3.5  
6. Conclusions 
Although the literature on determinants of service offshoring has grown substantially in 
the last few years, there is still relatively very little information on this subject that looks 
at individual firm data. This paper aims to gain a deeper understanding of this process, 
taking advantage of the information on Spanish firms that offshore R&D services, 
which is available in the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) constructed by the 
Spanish Statistical Institute. 
 
The analysis is limited to firms with innovation expenditure, which is an average of 
7,500 a year. According to this data, approximately 7% of innovative firms offshore 
R&D, with R&D offshoring intensity (percentage of purchases of foreign R&D services 
over total R&D purchases) around 5% and 14.3%, respectively, in individual firms and 
in firms that belong to business groups.   
 
The analysis of determinants of the decision to offshore R&D in this paper provides 
evidence that is generally in accordance with the previous empirical literature: irrespec-
tive of belonging to a business group, exporting character, continuous R&D engage-
ment, R&D employment and applying for patents show a positive impact on the proba-
bility of undertaking R&D offshoring. However, a lack of financing is an obstacle rela-
tively more important for independent firms than for firms that belong to business 
groups. These latter firms, especially if they are subsidiaries of multinationals, can ben-
efit from the resources and capabilities of the group and therefore would perceive obsta-
cles to innovation as significantly less relevant than independent firms. 
 
                                                
5 Again, if we distinguish between manufacturing and service firms (Table A2 of the Annex), the main 
trends hold for both groups. Notice, however, that the obstacles to innovation have no effect on the choice 
of governance mode for services firms.   
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In order to clarify the factors that influence the decision to offshore R&D for firms that 
belong to a business group, the estimation of a multiple decision model is also used, 
where four options are considered: not undertaking R&D offshoring, offshoring R&D 
only within the group, offshoring R&D only through the market (international R&D 
outsourcing), and offshoring R&D through both channels. The results confirm the posi-
tive effect that exporting character of firms and R&D employment have on all types of 
R&D offshoring. Furthermore, we find that some variables have a different effect de-
pending on the strategy followed by the firm: a lack of information is an obstacle rela-
tively more important for external R&D offshoring than for internal R&D offshoring. In 
particular, if the firms find institutional and market sources of information for innova-
tion very relevant as compared to internal sources of information, they will be more 
prone to offshore R&D services through the market.  
 
These results suggest that public policies which reduce financial constraints for R&D 
projects could be a suitable instrument if the government wants to stimulate the inser-
tion of independent firms in international markets through R&D offshoring. In addition, 
a clear, efficient and guiding public information system, which includes aspects such as 
available technology, market development and market characteristics, would favor the 
external offshoring of R&D services by firms that belong to business groups. 
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Annex 
Table A1. Determinants of R&D offshoring by sector of activity (generalized Tobit model). 
Marginal effects 
   Manufacturing firms Services firms 
 Pr( ) 1doss Intensity Pr( ) 1doss  Intensity  
International experience     
  Exporter (t-1) 0.020*** -0.079 0.029*** 0.160 
 (0.004) (0.152) (0.005) (0.159) 
Technical resources & capabilities     
  R&D employment 0.002*** 0.023*** 0.001*** 0.007** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) 
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.028***  0.011**  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
  Patent applicant  0.038*** 0.024 0.028*** 0.850*** 
 (0.005) (0.107) (0.007) (0.178) 
  Obstacles to innovation:     
  - Lack of financing -0.0001 -0.059 -0.006** 0.020 
 (0.002) (0.063) (0.003) (0.103) 
  - Lack of information -0.005** -0.098 0.000 -0.398***
 (0.002) (0.072) (0.003) (0.114) 
  Size 0.059*** 0.904*** 0.044*** 0.785*** 
 (0.007) (0.226) (0.006) (0.223) 
  Size squared -0.002*** -0.009 -0.004*** -0.032 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) (0.023) 
  Medium & high-tech sectors 0.011*** 0.437*** 0.004 0.194 
 (0.003) (0.104) (0.005) (0.183) 
  Sources of information for innovation     
  - Institutional sources  0.016*** 0.128 0.005 0.020 
(0.005) (0.118) (0.005) (0.174) 
  - Market sources  0.016*** 0.139 0.011* -0.311 
(0.005) (0.159) (0.006) (0.239) 
  - Internal sources  -0.002 -0.053 0.002 0.719*** 
(0.005) (0.149) (0.006) (0.217) 
Subsidiary  0.051*** 0.566*** 0.086*** 1.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.116) (0.016) (0.247) 
Rho  0.705***  -0.749 
  (0.069)  (0.113) 
No. obs. not censured/censured 15,590/1,365 8,451/501 
No. observations 16,955 8,952 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported at sample means for the probability of offshoring and for the 
expected value of R&D offshoring intensity conditional on offshoring R&D. For dummy variables, the 
marginal effect corresponds to the discrete change from 0 to 1. Estimated standard errors in parenthesis. 
(t-1) denotes that the variable is lagged one period. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signifi-
cant at 1%.  
  
26 
 
Table A2.  Determinants of internal and external R&D offshoring (Biprobit model).  
Marginal effects. Only firms in business groups 
 Manufacturing firms Services firms 
 
Internal 
Pr( ) 1Idoss
External 
Pr( ) 1Edoss
Internal 
Pr( ) 1Idoss  
External 
Pr( ) 1Edoss
International experience     
  Exporter (t-1)  0.014*** 0.017** 0.021*** 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Technical resources & capabilities     
  R&D employment 0.0004** 0.003*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.012** 0.027*** -0.003 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
  Patent applicant 0.012** 0.049*** 0.002 0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) 
  Obstacles to innovation:     
  - Lack of finance -0.004 0.009** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
  - Lack of information -0.003 -0.012*** -0.002 0.0002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
  Size 0.043*** 0.103*** 0.015** 0.046*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.006) (0.011) 
  Size squared -0.002** -0.005*** -0.001** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Medium & high-tech sectors   0.008* 0.014** 0.002 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) 
  Sources of information for innovation:     
  -  Institutional sources  -0.004 0.028*** 0.008 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
  - Market sources  -0.004 0.030*** 0.005 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) 
  - Internal sources  0.010 -0.011 0.005 -0.020** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) 
Foreign subsidiary 0.077*** -0.018*** 0.078*** 0.028** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) 
IE  0.295*** 0.510*** 
 (0.039) (0.061) 
No. observations  7,072 3,039 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported at sample means for the probability of observing each outcome. For 
dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the discrete change from 0 to 1. Estimated standard 
errors in parenthesis. (t-1) denotes that the variable is lagged one period. * significant at 10%; ** signifi-
cant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
